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COMMENTS
PLAINTIFF'S MEASURE OF RECOVERY FOR TORTIOUS
INDUCEMENT OF BREACH OF CONTRACTPROFITS OR LOSSES?
It is recognized in most jurisdictions today that an action in tort
for damages will be allowed against a defendant who has unjustly
induced a third person to breach a contract with a plaintiff,' or who
has otherwise interfered with the contractual relationships of others.2 Although the comparatively recent English case of Lumley v.
Gye3 is the leading decision establishing the present form and nature
of such an action, the roots of the tort are deeply embedded in both the
ancient Roman statutory law and the early English common law.4
Initially, the courts of the United States were reluctant to embrace this particular tort action,5 but the doctrine of liability has
gradually
spread and is now accepted almost everywhere in this country.6 In the early case of Boyson v. Thorne7 California at first limited
the action to situations involving means of inducement unlawful in
themselves. However, both legal writers8 and later California decisions9 quickly indicated dissatisfaction with these restrictions and in
1941 the California Supreme Court modified'0 its position in the land1 The cases are collected in Annot., 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933), and Annot., 26
A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952).
2 See, e.g., Bradford Corp. v. Webster, [19201 2 K.B. 135 (party to contract disabled by injuries); McNary v. Chamberlain, 34 Conn. 384 (1867).

See generally Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARv. L.
REv. 728, '731 (1928); Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations,
31 HARv. L. Rnv. 1017 (1918) (cases cited therein).
3 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
4 For a good look at the historical background of this action, see Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. Ruv. 663 (1923).

5 The history of the New York decisions is quite typical. See W. PRossM,
TORTS § 123, at 953 n.62 (3d ed. 1964).
6 Louisiana continues to hold that inducing breach of a contract is no
tort unless unlawful means in themselves are used. Robert Heard Hale, Inc.
v. Gaiennie, 102 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 1958). This attitude is echoed by what

is evidently the last word from Kentucky. Brooks v. Patterson, 234 Ky. 757, 29
S.W.2d 26 (1930).
7 98 Cal. 578, 33 P. 492 (1893).
8 Comment, Liability for Negligent Interference with Contract Relations,

23 CALIF. L. Ruv. 420, 425 (1935); Comment, Torts: Interference with Contract: Interference with Business: Justification, 24 CALIF. L. Rnv. 208 (1936).
9 California Grape Control Bd. v. California Prods. Corp., 4 Cal. App. 2d
242, 40 P.2d 846 (1935); Patterson Glass Co. v. Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 559, 183
P. 190 (1919).
10 Boyson has never been overruled. Justice Traynor distinguished Boy-

son on the grounds that the agency relationship in Boyson furnished an abso-

lute privilege for the defendant. See Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d
33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941). For a discussion of the results of this distinguishment,
see Comment, Torts: Privilege to Interfere with Contract Relations, 30 CALIF.
L. REv. 181 (1942).
[1119]

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 19

mark case of Imperal Ice Co. v. Rossier," adopting the majority viewpoint. Although the remedy for such an invasion in California and
other jurisdictions has been almost uniformly one in tort for dam-

ages, 1 2 a different measure of recovery may be warranted where the

defendant has not only caused damage to the plaintiff by his interference, but has also managed to harvest a profit for himself as a
result of his tortious actions. The question has been raised 13 whether
a plaintiff in this situation may elect to appropriate these ill-gotten
profits in lieu of any damages to which he might have recourse in a
tort action. It is the purpose of this comment to provide a foundation
for answering that general question in the affirmative 4 by discussing
two possible alternatives for so reaching those profits: (1) waiving
the tort of inducing a breach of contract and suing in quasi-contract
for recovery of the benefits reaped by the defendant; or (2) reclassifying the particular tort of inducing a breach of contract under
the more diverse nomenclature of "unfair competition," thus gaining
access to the defendant's profits through the use of the equitable
remedies of accounting and constructive trust.

Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit
Waiver of Torts Generally
The practice of "waiving"' 5 a tort and suing in quasi-contract
arose out of the common law action of assumpsit, 16 and was extended
to its present day form with the aid of various legal fictions and
fantasies.' 7 Perhaps the most succinct summary is that given by
Dean Prosser:
Out of this common law procedure [assumpsit] there has developed the doctrine that where the commission of a tort results in the
unjust enrichment of the defendant at the plaintiff's expense, the
plaintiff may disregard, or "waive" the tort action, and sue instead
on a theoretical and fictitious contract for restitution of the benefits
which the defendant has so received.' 8

But a quasi-contractual remedy is not available for all torts;
11 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
12 For a discussion of the different measures of damages possible in a
tort action, see Note, Damages Recoverable in an Action for Inducing Breach
of Contract, 30 CoLum. L. REv. 232 (1930). If the defendant has acted maliciously, punitive damages may also be recoverable.
13 Teller, Restitution as an Alternative Remedy for a Tort, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40,
50 (1956).
14 For a discussion of California law, see text accompanying notes 15872, infra.
15 "Waiver" is an unfortunate term since the quasi-contract action itself
exists only because of the tort, and there is merely an election between alternative, co-existing remedies. See W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS, 159-60
(1893); Teller, Restitution as an Alternative Remedy for a Tort, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40
(1956).
16 See generally Ames, History of Assumpsit (pts. 1-2), 2 HARv. L. Rzv.
1, 53, 67 (1888).
17 For a review of waiver of tort in general, see Keener, Waiver of Tort,
6 HAav. L. REv. 223 (1893); Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19
YALE L.J. 221 (1910); Teller, Restitution as an alternative Remedy for a Tort,
2 N.Y.L.F. 40 (1956).
Is W. PRossER, TORTS § 94, at 644 (3d ed. 1964) (footnotes omitted).
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beyond the fact that a tort has been committed, it must further appear that the tortfeasor has been enriched. 19 The initial guidelines
for determining the type of tort which could be waived were promulgated by Lord Mansfield in two early English cases, 20 and while there
have been some attempts to restrict the use of waiver to specific
criteria eswrongdoings 21 or to abolish it altogether, 22 the general
23
tablished in those cases have endured to the present day.
In the first of these cases, 24 Lord Mansfield indicated that restitution would be limited to those cases where the tortfeasor had been
unjustly enriched by his wrong and was "under an obligation, from

the ties of natural justice, to refund" this amount.2 5 Sixteen years
later in the case of Hambly v. Trott,20 Lord Mansfield again had

occasion to define the area of injuries in which assumpsit would be
allowed as an alternative remedy. He elaborated upon his earlier
statements with the following words:
If it is a sort of injury by which the offender acquires no gain to himself at the expense of the sufferer, as beating or imprisoning a man,
the person injured has only a reparation for the delictum in
damages to be assessed by a jury. But where, besides the crime,
for
property is acquired which benefits the testator, there an action
27
the value of the property shall survive against the executor.

Thus, where the defendant has merely damaged the plaintiff, neg-

ligently 28 or otherwise, 29 without benefit to himself, the plaintiff

cannot raise an implied debt by merely declaring his "waiver" of the
tort.3 0 Similarly, restitution will not lie against a wrongdoer where
a third party, not the wrongdoer himself, received the benefit.8 ' It
is only when the tortfeasor himself has reaped an inequitable profit
as a direct result of his wrongful conduct that the alternative remedy of quasi-contract is available.
19 Reynolds Bros. v. Padgett, 94 Ga. 347, 21 S.E. 570 (1894); Greer v.
Newland, 70 Kan. 315, 78 P. 835 (1904); Kyle v. Chester, 42 Mont. 552, 113
P. 749 (1911); RESTATEMENT OF REsTiTuTIoN, Introductory Note §§ 128-38, at
523 (1937). See also Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE
L.J. 221 (1910).
20 Hambly v. Trott, 98 Eng. Rep. 1136 (K.B. 1776); Moses v. Macferlan,
97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
21 Professor Woodward was of the opinion that the particular tort of
inducing a breach of contract was not one that could be waived. F. WooDwARD, QUAsI CoNTRAcTS § 286, at 458 (1913).
22 Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221 (1910).
23

See R. GOFF & G. JoNEs, RESTiTuToN 428 (1966); W. PROSSER, TORTS

§ 94, at 645 (3d ed. 1964).
24

Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).

25 Id. at 678.
28
27

98 Eng. Rep. 1136 (K.B. 1776).

Id. at 1139.

28 Bigby v. United States, 188 U.S. 400 (1903); Altpeter v. Virgil State
Bank, 345 IlM. App. 585, 104 N.E.2d 334 (1952); New York Central R.R. v.
State, 242 App. Div. 421, 287 N.Y.S. 850 (1936).
29 Erickson v. Borchardt, 177 Minn. 381, 225 N.W. 145 (1929) (fraud);
Burleson v. Langdon, 174 Minn. 264, 219 N.W. 155 (1928) (conversion).
30 Minor v. Baldridge, 123 Cal. 187, 55 P. 783 (1898); Patterson v. Prior,
18 Ind. 440 (1862); Patterson v. Kasper, 182 Mich. 281, 148 N.W. 690 (1914).
31 Scherger v. Union Nat'l Bank, 138 Kan. 239, 25 P. 2d 588 (1933); Ward
v. Guthrie, 193 Ky. 76, 234 S.W. 955 (1921); Taylor v. Currey, 216 Il. App.
19 (1919).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1122

[Vol 19

Waiving the Tori of Inducing a Breach of Contraci
While the history of the tort action of inducing a breach of
contract is rooted in antiquity, the practice of waiving this particular
tort and suing for restitution in quasi-contract is of much more recent vintage. Not surprisingly, the earliest cases of waiver for this
tort were concerned with providing an alternative remedy for a
master who had been denied the services of his apprentice as a result
of a third party's interference. While personal service contracts
have historically been under the jealous watch and protection of all
have stressed the integrity
courts, the English courts in particular
33
32
Forty-five years before Lumley
of the employment relationship.
crystallized the tort action for inducing a breach of contract, an English court held that a master of an apprentice who had been lured
away by the defendant might waive the tort and bring an action of
indebitatus assumpsit for the work and labor done by his apprentice
for the defendant. 34 Although some doubt has been expressed as to
the validity of this decision,35 it was followed in 1814 by the case of
Foster v. Stewart3 0 which confirmed a recovery in restitution for the
services of an apprentice who had been induced to work elsewhere.
Meanwhile, in the United States, the New York Supreme Court in 1810
had adopted the English view and held that a master could recover
for the reasonable value of the work done by his apprentice for the
defendant, without having to deduct from his recovery the wages
advanced to the apprentice by the defendant. 37 Some time later, in
yet another master-servant case, 38 the Georgia Supreme Court indicated it would allow an employer whose cotton pickers had been enticed away to recover from the defendant for the reasonable value of
such services, and boldly measured the value of the labor by concluding:
[T]he correct rule of damages, when one person entices away the
servant of another, is the ... average net profits that were made by
men of fair business capacity out of the labor 3 of
9 such a servant dur-

ing the year for which the servant was hired.
Thus, there is competent case authority establishing an early
rule that an action in quasi-contract for the labor of a servant in40
duced by another to breach his employment contract will be allowed,
with at least one case permitting the plaintiff to reach the profits of
legal writers have generally accepted
the tortfeasor. 41 Contemporary
42
this judicial view.
32 The shortages of labor in England after the Black Death played a significant role in sanctifying the relationship between master and servant. See
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REV. 663 (1923).

Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
Lightly v. Clouston, 127 Eng. Rep. 774 (Ch. 1808).
35 R. JAcKsON, THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISn LAw 80
(1936).
36 105 Eng. Rep. 582 (K.B.).
37 James v. LeRoy, 6 Johns. 274 (N.Y. 1810).
38 Lee v. West, 47 Ga. 311 (1872).
33
84

89 Id. at 318.
40
41
42

But see Huff v. Watkins, 20 S.C. 477 (1883).

Lee v. West, 47 Ga. 311 (1872).
See W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 189 (1893); Sayre, Inducing Breach
of Contract, 36 HAav. L. REv. 663 (1923); Teller, Restitution as an Alternative
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The immediate effect of these decisions upon other areas of
contractual relations was perhaps somewhat delayed by the fact
that the courts had always regarded a master-servant situation as a
rather special one that was worthy of extraordinary protection. Nevertheless, these cases did provide some foundation not only for the
validity of an action in quasi-contract as an alternative remedy in
general, but also for the waiver of the particular tort of inducing a
breach of contract. Their significance should be neither overlooked
nor underestimated.
Measure of Recovery in Quasi-Contrac-An Introduction to the
Problem
Before considering the measure of recovery in quasi-contract for
the particular tort of inducing a breach of contract, a somewhat extended digression into the background of quasi-contracts is necessary
to ascertain what principles of recovery apply generally. Is recovery
in quasi-contract to be limited to the value of what the plaintiff has
lost or will recovery extend to all that the defendant has acquired, although the latter amount may exceed the former? The primary
difficulty is that any search for a general rule as to whether or not the
profits of a tortfeasor are recoverable in a quasi-contractual action is
initially complicated by the welter of semantic and substantive inconsistencies prevalent both in judicial opinions and in the textual
writings of authors and authorities. Indeed, the very nature of the
action of quasi-contract has been vociferously disputed since Lord
Mansfield's sweeping use of language in the early case of Moses v.
Macferlan43 purported to cement the action upon equitable principles
of "natural justice." 4 4 While this theory has been hailed as "rescuing" the law of quasi-contracts from "the marsh of technicality into
46
which it was sinking,145 it has also been dismissed as too "sloppy"
47
or "vague" to be of any realistic value. The dominant controversy
has centered around the issue of whether Lord Mansfield separated
quasi-contract from the antiquated grasp of assumpsit and established a whole new action founded upon and absorbing the law of
equity as practiced in the chancery courts,48 or whether he merely

Remedy for a Tort, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40, 50 (1956). But see F. WOODWARD, QUASI
CONTRACTS § 285(4), at 458 (1913).
43 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
44 "In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon
the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and
equity to refund the money." Id. at 681. Prior to Macferlan, the plaintiff had
based his action upon an implied promise of the defendant. See Slade's Case,
76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602). But in Macferan Lord Mansfield went one step
further and implied a debt. 97 Eng. Rep. at 678. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
45 P. Wn*-n, QUASI-CONTRACTS 9 (1952).
46 "[Tlhe whole history of this particular form of action [money had
and received) has been what I may call a history of well-meaning sloppiness
of thought." Holt v. Markham, E19231 1 KB. 504, 513 (Scrutton, L.J.).
47 "Whatever may have been the case 146 years ago, we are not now free
in the twentieth century to administer that vague jurisprudence which is
sometimes attractively styled 'justice as between man and man.'" Baylis v.
Bishop of London, [1913] 1 Ch. 127, 140 (Hamilton, L.J., later Lord Sumner).
48 See Straton v. Rastall, 100 Eng. Rep. 197, 199 (K.B. 1788).

1124

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

utilized equitable terms to describe an action that was primarily contractual in nature as well as form.4 9 By ignoring the fiction of an
implied promise as the basis for quasi-contract and turning instead
to equitable principles of unjust enrichment, the measure of recovery
in quasi-contract could be expanded by the use of the equitable remedies of the constructive trust or accounting, both of which are effective to recover the profits of a tortfeasor. Mansfield himself later
referred to quasi-contract as a "liberal action in the nature of a bill
in equity,"50 thus apparently linking his own concepts of its nature
to the nonlegal considerations of morality and natural justice found
in the chancery courts. 51 It is interesting to note that this stressing
of "justice" as the basis of quasi-contract brought no immediate
repercussions. Later English authorities periodically sniped at Mansfield's broad language in Moses v. Macferlan, 52 but it was not until
the dawn of the 20th century that any really harsh criticisms appeared. The derogations culminated in 1914 with Sinclair v. Brougham 53 a House of Lords decision in which Lord Sumner, vigorously
striking down any connection between the "equity" of chancery and
the "equity" of Lord Mansfield, reunited the action of quasi-contract
to its historical basis of an implied promise, effectively relegating the
field of quasi-contract to a "neglected backwater in the province of
contract."54 It was to remain there, however, for only a relatively
short period of time. But before considering briefly the events in
England which led to the repudiation of this "implied promise" doctrine and the subsequent rehabilitation of the theories of Lord Mansfield, it is best to examine the status of quasi-contract as it existed
in the United States during these early years.
While nearly all early American authorities had uncompromisingly founded the nature of quasi-contract upon principles of "unjust
enrichment, 55 they did not fully succeed in escaping the substantive
difficulties of their English counterparts. On the contrary, it seems to
be clear that any concept of "unjust enrichment" used by these early
American writers as a basis for quasi-contract enjoyed neither the
depth nor scope of the concept of "unjust enrichment" underlying
remedies in equity. Their use, however, of this particular term is
not surprising. At the time the first authoritative American work
49

"All these causes of action are common species of the genus assumpsit.

All now rest, and long have rested, upon a notional or imputed promise to
repay." Sinclair v. Brougham, [1914] A.C. 398, 452.
50 Clarke v. Shee, 98 Eng. Rep. 1041, 1042 (K.B. 1774).

51 "He [Mansfield] seems to have regarded the 'equity' administered in
the Court of Chancery as synonymous with natural justice, and to have hoped
to introduce it into the common law courts." J.MuNuKMA-, QuAsI-CoNmAcTs
6 (1950).
52 Note 20 supra.

53 [1914] A.C. 398.

7 (1950).
55 "[T]he plaintiff's right to recover rests upon the doctrine that a man
shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another."
54 J. MUNKMAN, QUASI-CONTRAcTS

W. KEENER, QUASI-CoNTRACTS 19 (1893).

"It is of the essence of the quasi

contractual obligation that the retention of the benefit received by the defendant would be unjust." F. WOODWARD,

QUASI

CONTRACTS § 9, at 9 (1913).

also Corbin, Quasi-ContractualObligations,21 YALE L.J. 533 (1912).

See
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on quasi-contracts was published by Professor Keener in 1893,56 the
"natural justice" theory of Lord Mansfield had not yet been effectively discredited, thus making Keener's adoption of this phrase
together with its theoretical connotations almost imperative. But
while Professor Keener was explicit in pointing out that the equitable
principle of unjust enrichment was the basis for a quasi-contractual
remedy,57 he was not ready to fully assimilate the liberal measures of
recovery allowed in a court of equity for unjust enrichment, as Lord
Mansfield probably intended. Instead, Keener theorized that any
unjust enrichment had to be at the expense of the plaintiff, or clearly
identifiable with the loss of such plaintiff, before he could seek a
recovery in quasi-contract. As Keener put it: "[It] is not sufficient
for the plaintiff to prove that defendant has committed a tort whereby
he has enriched himself. It must further appear that what has been
added to the defendant's estate has been taken from the plaintiff's.
That is to say, the facts must show, not only a plus, but a minus
quantity."5 8
Anxious to adopt unjust enrichment as the basis for quasi-contract and also limit quasi-contractual recovery to "plus and minus"
quantities, Keener was forced to accept the fiction of an implied contract between the plaintiff and the defendant at least for purposes of
measuring the recovery.5 9 As Keener cautioned:
But it does not follow that [because the unjust enrichment of the defendant is the basis for quasi-contract] the measure of recovery is to
bear any relation to the amount of profit made by the defendant. The
plaintiff in a case of this sort [waiver of tort] should recover such a
sum as the jury would have been authorized to give, had there been
a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. . .
Any question as to incidental or collateral profit made by the 60tortfeasor-in
fact, the entire question of profit-should be excluded.
With this conclusion limiting the recovery of a plaintiff to losses
measured by contractualstandards, it is clear that Keener retreated
somewhat from his earlier statements that any idea of a contract
between the tortfeasor and the plaintiff was an unnecessary "fiction"
and should be abolished. 6 1 This brings into focus, then, what Keener
considered to be the nature of unjust enrichment as it was applicable
to recovery in quasi-contract. Rather than stressing the unjustness of
all defendant's gains tortiously acquired, only those gains which could
be clearly associated with another's losses could be denominated as
"unjust enrichment," leaving the defendant free to keep those re-maining benefits which the plaintiff could not prove to have been
directly taken from his own estate.62 Keener further clarified his
position on the measure of recovery with his emphasis of unjust en56 W. KENER, QUAsi-CoNTRAcTs

(1893).

57 Id. at 19; see note 55 supra.
58 Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
59 As to the nature of quasi-contracts, Keener explicitly excluded any
idea of a contract between the parties. "It is idle to speak of the possibility
of contract where there is not even the suggestion of a meeting of minds."
Id. at 24.
60 Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 160.
62 This is merely a logical extension of Keener's "plus and minus" theory.
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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richment as the basis for what the defendant could keep:63
Since the plaintiff's claim rests upon the fact that the defendant
cannot be allowed in good conscience to keep what he has obtained,
the measure of the plaintiff's recovery is not the entire amount [of
benefits tortiously acquired] ... but [only] the amount which it is
against conscience for the defendant to keep.
While this recourse to the defendant's conscience to limit the
plaintiff's recovery appears to be a rather unique concept of unjust
enrichment, it is really only an extension of other arguments that
unjust enrichment within the framework of quasi-contract is synonymous with "compensation" and should not be utilized to widen a
plaintiff's recovery in law.64 The conclusion can only be drawn that
while Keener may have picked up the phraseology of Lord Mansfield,
he did not absorb the broad sentiments of true equity underlying them.
This point assumes additional importance in light of the fact that
other American authorites on quasi-contract published subsequent
to Keener borrowed freely from his writings and theories in support of
their own concepts of the profit-loss relationship in quasi-contract.
Professor Woodward, writing in 1913,65 quoted directly from
Keener's "plus and minus" passage, adding his own confirmation of
this theory with the following:
Perhaps it was arguable at one time that the obligation of a tortfeasor
in assumpsit is analogous to that of a constructive trustee and that he
should be held accountable for any profits derived by him from his
wrongful act. It seems to be now taken for granted, however, that
the obligation is not to account for profits but to make restitution.
It follows that it is not enough to show that the defendant has been
enriched by his wrong; it must further appear 66that the benefit received by him has been taken from the plaintiff.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this statement is that
while Woodward categorically excludes the influence of equitable remedies from those in quasi-contract by taking for "granted" that profits
are not recoverable, he cites no authority other than Keener to support this statement. One possible explanation for this dogmatism is
that at the time Woodward was writing his text, Lord Mansfield's
equitable theory of natural justice as the basis for quasi-contract was
under heavy attack by England's "traditional" 67 school of quasi-contractual authorities. While Woodward definitely rejected the theory
of an implied promise as being the nature of quasi-contract, 68 he did
63
64

W. KEENER, QUAsI-CoNTRAcTS 183 (1893) (emphasis added).
"[In assumpsit the party cannot recover more than in an action of

tort ....

."

Foster v. Stewart, 105 Eng. Rep. 582, 586 (K.B. 1814) (dictum).

"[Tihe measure of damages should be the same as in a tort action, or at any
rate no greater. The legal fiction should not be indulged to enlarge the right."
Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221, 245 (1910).
65 F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913).
66 Id. at 441-42 (emphasis in the original).
67

As used by contemporary authorities on English law, "traditionalists"

refers to those authorities viewing the action of quasi-contract as resting upon
an implied contract rather than a theory of "natural justice" or unjust enrichment. See S. STOLJAR, QUAsI-CONTRACTS 3 (1964).
68 "It cannot be too strongly emphasized . . . that quasi-contracts are in
[Q]uasi-contractual obligations are imposed
no sense genuine contracts ....
without reference to the obligor's assent. He is bound, not because he has
promised to make restitution . .. but because he has received a benefit the
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not exclude the use of such a "fiction"69 to limit the measure of recovery. To at least that extent he was somewhat influenced by both
the virility of the English denunciations of Mansfield and the identical use of such contractual considerations by Professor Keener to
limit a plaintiff's recovery. 70 But while Keener and Woodward both
may have employed contractual standards to limit recovery in quasicontract, this was not the only argument which was available to cut
off from a plaintiff's recovery any benefits of the tortfeasor which
exceeded the plaintiff's losses. There had been some broad language
in early English cases indicating that the action of quasi-contract
should never be allowed where it would be "prejudicial" to a defendant. 71 This could, theoretically at least, be interpreted as restricting the plaintiff's recovery in quasi-contract to tort damages. While
this argument has attracted few converts, it did influence at least one
early American writer on quasi-contracts-Professor Corbin.
Writing shortly after the turn of the century, Corbin expressed
a "grave doubt as to the propriety of the whole doctrine of waiver of
tort and suit in assumpsit.172 Stressing the importance of the
tort giving rise to such an action in quasi-contract, rather than the
unjust enrichment of the defendant, Corbin logically concluded that
the amount recoverable in quasi-contract "ought never to be allowed
to exceed the amount of the plaintiff's injury." 73 Corbin, however,
did at least recognize the argument that a tortfeasor should not be
allowed to keep any part of his "unholy enrichment,17 4 but proposed
an alternative solution to the plaintiff receiving any amount in excess of his loss. Arguing that since any judicial disgorging of gains
exceeding a plaintiff's loss was nothing more than a "punitive" measure anyway, Corbin concluded that the state75 should confiscate any
This suggestion has
the general public.
such excess on behalf of
76
met with little approval.

retention of which would be inequitable." F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTACTS 6

(1913).

69 "[T]he whole law of quasi-contract, from the remedial point of view,
depends upon the fiction that the defendant has promised to do that which
in justice he ought to do." Id. at 440 (emphasis in the original).
70 "The continuance of such a fiction [implied promise of the tortfeasor
to make restitution]" does exist "for the purpose of a remedy." W. KEENER,
QUAsI-CoNTRACTS 160 (1893).
71 See Foster v. Stewart, 105 Eng. Rep. 582, 586 (K.B. 1814). Usually any
such language is merely dictum explaining why a defendant is not prejudiced.
As Lord Mansfield said: "This [action for money had and received] is equally
[H]e can be liable no further than the
beneficial to the defendant. ...
money he has received.

1760).
72

. .

."

Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 679 (K.B.

See also Lindon v. Hooper, 98 Eng. Rep. 1160 (K.B. 1776).
Corbin, Waiver of Tort-Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221, 245-46

(1910).
Id. at 244.
"But it may be said that the plaintiff ought to recover the full amount
of the defendant's unholy enrichment because it is unjust for the defendant
to retain any of it." Id.
75 "[T]he fine ought to go to the state, and it ought to be measured by
73
74

Id. at 245.
the character of the wrong ....
76 The reporters of the Restatement of Restitution realized that allowing

a plaintiff to recover the ill-gotten profits of the defendant introduced an
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While Corbin, Woodward and Keener may all have agreed that
the obligation of a tortfeasor to make restitution in quasi-contract
would not include a requirement to account for profits, none of them
foresaw the subsequent disintegration between the theories of equitable unjust enrichment and legal unjust enrichment which has altered
not only the nature of quasi-contract but also the measure of recovery for such an action. In England, the disintegration achieved
rather dramatic proportions because of the necessity to overcome the
direct authority of the Sinclai?"77 case that an "implied promise"
was the basis for quasi-contract.
As stated earlier, the Sinclair case was the high water mark of
this implied contract theory within England. But the seeds of
"natural justice" planted in quasi-contract by Lord Mansfield, instead
73
of being strangled by English traditionalists, were only "pruned.
7
9
What started as a mere trickle of discontent over Lord Sumner's
eradication of Mansfield's equitable propositions soon became a swelling tide of judicial 0 and textual s authority calling for a theory of
quasi-contract based upon "modern" 8 2 notions of unjust enrichment.
The final blow8 3 seems to have been delivered in 1943 with Lord

Wright's opinion in the case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn
"element of punishment" to restitution, but did not find this to be "shocking."
Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29, 37 (1938).
77 Sinclair v. Brougham, [1914] A.C. 398.
78 "[Tlhe criticisms of Lord Mansfield's doctrine [of natural justice]
may be regarded rather as pruning some of the exuberance of his docQUASI-CoNTRACTS 1314 (1952).

*

. .

trine than as axes laid at the roots of it." P. WnoFIED,

79 See J.G.P., Book Review, 30 L.Q. REv. 242 (1914).
80 "These fantastic resemblances of contracts invented in order to meet
requirements of the law as to forms of action which have now disappeared
should not in these days be allowed to affect actual rights." United Australia,
Ltd. v. Barclay's Bank, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1, 29 (Lord Atkin). See also Brook's
Wharf & Bull Wharf, Ltd. v. Goodman Bros., [1937] 1 K.B. 534, 545; CravenEllis v. Canins, Ltd., [19361 2 K.B. 403.
81 R. GOFF & G. JONES, RESTITUTION 11 (1966); P. WINFIELD, QuAsi-CoNTRACTS 20 (1952); Winfield, Note, 53 L.Q. REv. 447 (1937); Friedmann, Note,
id. at 449; Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REv. 29 (1938); Denning, The
Recovery of Money, 65 L.Q. REv. 37, 48 (1949).
82 This is just another way of saying a "return" to the views of Lord
Mansfield. In reviewing Mansfield's comment that "[TIhe defendant [in
quasi-contract] . . .is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity

. . .

,"

two very recent English writers have concluded: "We have only to substitute
'make restitution' for the last three words of his statement to make it appro-

priate for the whole law of restitution." R. GOFF & G. JoNEs, RESTITUTION 12

(1966).

83 Not all English authorities would agree to this. As late as 1952, Sir
Winfield wrote that while the implied contract theory was wrong, it was
still "prevalent." P. WINFIELD, QUASI-CONTRACTS 20 (1952). In 1964, Sir
Allen observed that the question of whether or not quasi-contract in English
law was based on principles of natural justice was "still hotly disputed." C.K.
ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 406 (7th ed. 1964). But other recent writers have
concluded that any discussion of an implied contract was a "barren topic."
R. GOFF & G. JoNES, RESTITUTION 11 (1966). Lord Simonds has likewise labeled it a "rather arid dispute." Ministry of Health v. Simpson, [1951] A.C.
251, 275.
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Lawson Barbour,Ltd. 4 Referring to the "ghosts"8 5 of implied promises that had haunted the field of quasi-contract since the days of
assumpsit, Lord Wright returned quasi-contract to Mansfield's principles of natural justice, finishing with this interpretation of that
eory:
Lord Mansfield does not say that the law implies a promise. The law
implies a debt or obligation which is a different thing .... The obligation is a creation of the law . . .[and] belongs to a third class,
distinct from either contract or tort, though it resembles contract
rather than tort. This statement [of natural justice] of Lord Mansfield has been the basis of the modern law of quasi-contract, notwithstanding the criticisms which have been launched against it.8s
In the United States, the merging of the principles of quasicontract with those of equity was far less climactic. This is hardly
surprising in view of the fact that as far as the nature of quasicontract was concerned, both Woodward and Keener had rightly concluded that its true foundation lay upon the equitable bedrock of unjust enrichment.8 7 While both of them, however, had qualified this
term with respect to the measure of recovery to be allowed in quasicontract,8 8 subsequent authorities have failed to make this distinction.

Instead, there has gradually accumulated nonrestrictive utterances
from the bench and elsewhere to the effect that actions in quasicontract, although legal in form, are equitable in nature and governed by equitable principles.89 Countless repetitions of this broad
theme have had their effect on both the structure and scope of restitution in quasi-contract. The unjust enrichment theory supporting
the equitable remedies of the constructive trust and accounting
have been more and more absorbed into the law of quasi-contract,
expanding the legal measure of recovery for unjust enrichment by
placing emphasis on the defendant's unjust gain rather than on the
plaintiffs loss or expense 0 This is reflected in the dilution of Professor Keener's "plus and minus" theory 9 ' of recovery by modern
authorities. As Dean Prosser has concluded: "Restitution in quasicontract ... looks to what the defendant has received which in good

conscience should belong to the plaintiff; and this may be either more
or less than the amount of the plaintiff's actual loss.1'92
84

[1943] A.C. 32.

85 The language was borrowed from Lord Atkin's opinion in the United

Australia case: 'When these ghosts of the past [theory of implied contracts]
stand in the path of justice clanking their mediaeval chains the proper course
for the judge is to pass through them undeterred." United Australia, Ltd. v.
Barclay's Bank, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1, 29.
86 [19431 A.C. 32, 62.
87 Note 55 supra.
88 See text accompanying notes 55-71 supra.
89 The cases are too numerous to cite. They are collected in 58 C.J.S.
Money Received § 1, at 907 nn.3-4 (1948). See also W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 94,
at 647 (3d ed. 1964); York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort
Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 499, 546 (1957).
90 See, e.g., Qlwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652
(1946).
91

W.

KEENER, QuAsi-CoNTRAcTs

165 (1893); see text accompanying note

58 supra.
92 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 94, at 644-45 (3d ed. 1964) (emphasis added).
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Other contemporary American writers have echoed this shift of
emphasis.93 The American Law Institute has combined all remedies
based on unjust enrichment (legal and equitable) into one coherent
and separate body of law known as Restitution. 94 The effect of the
disintegration between unjust enrichment in equity and unjust enrichment in quasi-contract is reflected in the introductory note to the
Restatement of Restitution:
The Restatement of this Subject deals with situations in which one
person is accountable to another on the ground that otherwise
he
would unjustly benefit or the other would unjustly suffer loss. 95
This emphasis upon either an unjust gain or an unjust loss, with the
inherent possibility of recovering a defendant's profits, is even better
illustrated in the introductory note to the topic on "Measure of Recovery." Commenting upon the situation where the benefits gained
by a tortfeasor are either more or less than the losses of the plaintiff,
the Institute recommended as follows:
In such cases the measure of restitution is determined with reference
to the tortiousness of the defendant's conduct or the negligence or
other fault of one or both of the parties in creating the situation giving rise to the right in restitution. If the defendant was toritious in
his acquisition of the benefit he is required to pay for what the other
has lost although that is more than the recipient benefited. If he
was consciously tortious in acquiring the benefit, he6 is also deprived
of any profit derived from his subsequent use of it.0
Writing the year after the Restatement of Restitution had been
published, the official reporters for this work had this to say about
the benefits of waiving a tort and suing in quasi-contract for restitution:
[F]requently the measure of recovery would be the same upon either
the tort theory of damage or the restitution theory of value received.
However, in the quasi-contractual proceeding, the accent may change
from 'restitution' to 'unjust enrichment'; in many cases the plaintiff
is entitled to get back more than
he lost, since ill-gotten profits can
be required to be surrendered.97
By now it should be clear that as far as contemporary writers are
concerned, the measure of recovery in quasi-contract should not be
limited by contractual standards but should be broadened to reflect
those types of recovery allowed in equity for unjust enrichment.
The courts, however, have been hesitant to apply equitable remedies
explicitly to enlarge a plaintiff's measure of recovery in quasi-contract
to so include the profits of a tortfeasor. The majority of courts
have predicated any use of the equitable remedies of accounting or
constructive trust on either a fiduciary relationship9" or "special cir93 "It [restitution] looks not to the plaintiff's damages but to the benefit
which defendant obtained ... ." Teller, Restitution as an Alternative Remedy
for a Tort, 2 N.Y.L.F. 40, 47 (1956). See also R. GOFF & G. JONEs, RESTITuTiow
16 (1966); York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4
U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 499 (1957).
(1937).
95 Id., General Scope Note, at 1.
96 Id., Introductory Note §§ 150-59, at 596.
94 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

97 Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29, 37 (1938)
added).

(emphasis

98 Merchants Importing, Inc. v. Kuhn & Schneider, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d
709, 276 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1967); Pedowski v. Southern Mich. Fruit Ass'n, 261
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cumstances"0 9 involving complicated factual situations. There is
evidence, however, that the courts will go far to bring a case within
these judicially acceptable boundaries of extraordinary recovery, and
the tort of inducing a breach of contract has not been overlooked. 100
Having illustrated the underlying principles of recovery in quasicontract generally, it is now appropriate to turn to an analysis of
those cases seeking recovery in quasi-contract for the particular tort
of inducing a breach of contract.
Measure of Recovery in Quasi-Coniract for Inducing a Breach of
Coniract
The expansion of the measure of recovery in quasi-contract
where the tort involves an inducement of a breach of contract has
been, at best, an uncoordinated, unauthoritative extension of legal
remedies. Much of this inconstancy arose, however, because the
instances where a plaintiff has sought the profits of a defendant
have been rare and the merger of equitable and legal remedies
based on unjust enrichment is only of recent development. The
result has been that no positive rule or body of law has yet emerged
to guide the courts in their handling of such cases. Consequently,
the courts have relied not so much upon each other for specific
authority as upon general axioms of unjust enrichment developed
elsewhere. By so doing, these courts have both extended recognition
to the dissolution of the barriers between legal and equitable remedies, and have also significantly contributed to that decomposition.
It is interesting to note that the cases which have expanded the
measure of recovery in quasi-contract have used as their common
denominator a decision which was actually rendered in equity.
This case, then, becomes the starting point.
In Angle v. The Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R.R.,10'
the United States Supreme Court, recognizing the rule that a right of
action will lie against a tortfeasor who has procured a breach of the
plaintiff's contract, allowed the plaintiff to bring a suit in equity to
have the defendant declared a trustee ex maleficio of tortiously secured property. Angle, the plaintiff, was a construction contractor
Mich. 271, 246 N.W. 58 (1933); Custis v. Serril, 303 Pa. 267, 154 A. 487 (1931).
See generally J.N. PomEROY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE & EQUITABLE RE1mmIns §§
2356-62 (4th ed. 1919).
99 Terrell v. Southern R.R., 164 Ala. 423, 51 So. 254 (1909); County of
Dallas v. Timberlake, 54 Ala. 403 (1875); Dyer Bros. Iron Works v. Central
Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 189 P. 445 (1920); Merchants Importing, Inc. v.
Kuhn & Schneider, Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 709, 276 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1967).

See

generally, J.N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE & EQUITABLE REmEDIES §§
2356-62 (4th ed. 1919).
100 A good example is Automatic Laundry Serv., Inc. v. Demas, 216 Md.
544, 141 A.2d 497 (1958). In this case the court found a "special relationship"
existing between the plaintiff and the other party to the contract because of

a profit-sharing agreement. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover all
the profits of the tortfeasor who induced the breach of this contract on the

rationale that such tortfeasor had "full knowledge" of such contract.

The

court, however, had not found any "special relationship" between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor on which to base this accounting.

101 151 U.S. 1 (1893).
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hired to build a railroad on land granted to his employer for that purpose. The defendant, a competitor of the grantee, wrongfully induced the state legislature to revoke this grant, thus forcing a breach
of the grantee's contract with Angle and obtaining for itself the title
to these lands. Although Angle secured a judgment against the
grantee for this breach, it was uncollectable due to insolvency. This
suit was subsequently brought to have the defendant declared a
trustee ex maleficio of the lands. The Supreme Court overruled
the defendant's demurrer, and awarded a constructive trust with this
broad comment: "Waiving the question as to the solvency of the
Omaha Company [defendant] . . .there remains the proposition that
it is contrary to equity that the defendant should be permitted to
that particular property ... [secured] by its
enjoy unmolested
10 2
wrongful acts.'
This principle of unjust enrichment utilized by the Supreme
Court in a suit in equity was seized upon by the District Court of
New York 27 years later as authority for its decision in Federal Sugar
Refining Co. v. U.S. Sugar Equalization Board,0 3 an action at law
for restitution.
In the Federal Sugar Co. case the Norwegian Food Commission
had entered into a contract with the plaintiff for the purchase of 4,500
tons of refined sugar at a contract price of $6.60 per hundred pounds.
The defendant, Rolph, taking advantage of his influential office as
head of the Sugar Division of the United States Exports Administration Board,10 4 by fraudulent and unjustified interference induced the
Commission to breach its contract with the plaintiff and to purchase
the sugar at a price of $11 per hundred pounds from a company in
which Rolph was president and director. This secured for the defendant a larger profit than the plaintiff would have made had the
plaintiff's contract never been breached. The plaintiff decided to
waive the tort of contractual interference, bringing his action in
quasi-contract for money had and received. Since the case was decided on a demurrer, the court was not required to state specifically
that it was awarding to the plaintiff all the profits which the defendant had realized from his own contract with the Food Commission regardless of the disparity between these profits and the damages
suffered by the plaintiff. But it was obvious to the court on the
facts presented that the plaintiff had not suffered any tangible outof-pocket loss as a result of the defendant's action, nor could the
plaintiff ever have realized from his own contract the pecuniary
amount he was now seeking to recover from the defendant. Nevertheless, while the court acknowledged that the plaintiff could not
have recovered such profits under Keener's "plus and minus" theory of recovery in quasi-contract, it felt that the definition of unjust
enrichment had become extended,10 5 and it desired to give recognition to this extension by basing its decision on "broader grounds."'01 6
102

Id. at 25.

103 268 F. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
104 The defendant had told the Food Commission that the United States
Government had ordered the sugar sold at 110 per pound. Id. at 579.
105 Id.at 582 n.1.
106 "In the case at bar it might further be contended, not without merit,
that the case comes within the limitations [of recovery] stated by Keener and
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07
Citing the equitable principles espoused in Angle and elsewhere,
the court summed up its interpretation of quasi-contractual restitution with these words:
The point is not whether a definite something was taken away from
the plaintiff and added to the treasury of the defendant. The point
is whether defendant unjustly enriched himself by doing a wrong to

plaintiff in such manner and in such circumstances that in equity and
not be permitted to retain that by
good conscience defendant should
08

which it has been enriched.
Although Judge Mayer's language in the Federal Sugar Co. case
was initially criticized as "ignoring the fundamental theory of restitution,"''1 9 it has more recently been praised as properly interpreting
the present equitable trend of the law of quasi-contract. 110 It is
actually less an extension of the law of quasi-contract than a belated
unification of those principles underlying the remedies for unjust enrichment in equity with those principles supporting restitution in
law. Since the nature of quasi-contract has always, at least in
America, been based upon equitable foundations of unjust enrichment,"' it seems justifiable that the measure of recovery in quasicontract would follow the same pattern. By its recognition of equitable concepts supporting the measure of recovery in quasi-contract
as well as the nature of quasi-contract, the court in Federal Sugar
did much to reform and strengthen the practicality of an action at
law for restitution.
But while the unusually forthright language of the Federal Sugar
Co. case makes it perhaps the most dramatic example of the deterioration of Keener's antiquated fiction of an implied contract limiting
the measure of recovery in quasi-contract, it is not the only example.
This anachronism of an implied contract has suffered further erosion
as exemplified in the following two cases.
In 1926, the circuit court of appeals in New York added to this
erosion with its decision in Second Nat'l Bank of Toledo v. Samuel
& Sons, Inc." 2 While the question of profits was not directly involved, the case is applicable since the court further cleared the way
for reaching a tortfeasor's profits in quasi-contract by an equitable
outflanking of Woodward's stringent requirement that the benefits of
a defendant sought by a plaintiff in quasi-contract must be singularly
identifiable with the losses suffered by such plaintiff.
In Samuel & Sons, the defendant had procured an irrevocable
letter of credit from a trust company to be used as partial payment
for acquiring scrap metal from an Army ordnance depot. The plaintiff bank was the purchaser of a draft which had been issued by the
Woodward; but I prefer to rest my conclusion on the broader ground [of
equitable principles]." Id. at 583.
107 The court quoted with approval from Note, What Constitutes "Receipt of Benefit" in Quasi-Contract,20 CoLum. L. REv. 602 (1920). 268 F.
at 583.
108 268 F. at 582 (emphasis added).
109 See 5 Mnhw. L. REV. 401 (1921); id.at 567.
110 See Comment, Quasi-Contracts-Torts-Quasi-Contractas an Alternative Remedy for Interference with ContractRelations, 33 McH. L. REv. 420
(1935).
"I1 See text accompanying notes 55-71 supra.
112 12 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 720 (1926).
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commanding officer of the depot in reliance upon the defendant's
letter of credit. Although the draft was subsequently offered by the
plaintiff to the trust company for payment in accordance with its
terms, the defendant induced the trust company not to honor the draft.
The plaintiff then chose to bring a suit in equity to have the defendant
declared a trustee ex maleficio as to the proceeds emanating from
the sale of the scrap metal. Recognizing that the plaintiff had a good
cause of action for a tortious inducement of a breach of contract, the
court preferred to keep inviolate the hallowed sanctuary of equity by
establishing plaintiff's right to a "full and complete" recovery at law
via waiver of tort and suit in assumpsit." 3 While the court took
comfort in Woodward's statement that quasi-contractual obligations
"rest . . . solely upon the universally recognized moral obligation of
11 4
one who has [unjustly] received a benefit ... to make restitution,"
it scrupulously omitted any reference to Woodward's subsequent and
damaging comment that "it is not enough to show that the defendant
has been enriched by his wrong; it must further appear that the
benefit received by him has been taken from the plaintiff.""1 5 Realizing that there was no direct benefit flowing from the defendant to
the plaintiff, the court nevertheless upheld an action in quasi-contract
by stressing the "equitable" nature of such an action. Using as its
foundation for quasi-contract Lord Mansfield's theory of "natural
justice,"" 6 the court reasoned that the plaintiff could pursue such a
legal remedy since the defendant had been "benefited to the extent
of the draft which remained unpaid,"" 7 and the retention of this bene' 8
fit "would work a serious injustice to the plaintiff.""
In remanding
the cause to the district court with directions to transfer the case
to the law side, the court summarized its theory of the plaintiff's
right to an action in quasi-contract with this statement:
As there is no question but that defendant has received property for
which it has not paid . . . there is a clear moral obligation to make
restitution to the plaintiff, who parted with its money ... in reliance
upon a letter of credit 9 . . . which the defendant induced the bank
wrongfully to revoke."i
This de-emphasis of Woodward's principle that "what has been
added to the defendant's estate . . . must have been taken [directly]
from the plaintiff's"' 20 was followed 10 years later, by the Supreme
2
Court of Pennsylvania in Caskie v. PhiladelphiaRapid Transit Co.1 1
There the defendant had fraudulently induced a railroad company
113 "[WIhere the remedy by assumpsit is full and complete, the resort
must be to that action and not to a suit in equity." Id. at 968. But see Angle
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1893). In that case, the defendant
had argued that the plaintiff's suit in equity should be dismissed because an
action at law would lie for damages. Mr. Justice Brewer answered as follows:
"[I]t is contrary to equity that the defendant should be permitted to enjoy
unmolested . . . property [secured] . . . by its wrongful acts." Id. at 25.
114 F. WOODWARD, QUAsI CONTRACTS § 6 (1913).
115 Id. § 274, at 442 (emphasis in the original).
116 See note 44 supra.
117 12 F.2d at 968.
Is Id. at 967.
"19 Id. at 968.
120 F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 442 (1913).
121 321 Pa. 157, 184 A. 17 (1936).
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to pay over proceeds which the railroad owed to the plaintiff on
an employment contract. The plaintiff brought his action in assumpsit for money had and received against the defendant, alleging
unjust enrichment. The court noted approvingly Judge Brewer's
use of the constructive trust in Angle as an alternative remedy to
reach property secured by tortious contractual interference, but in the
present case the plaintiff was not seeking to have the defendant declared a trustee ex maleficio.122 Turning to the plaintiff's right of recovery in quasi-contract, the court, in language strongly reminiscent
of Judge Mayer's comments in the Federal Sugar Co. case, 123 suggested this simple test for establishing the right to restitution in quasicontract: "The inquiry is: Had the defendant. . . received money or
property which he is not entitled to keep and which in equity and good
conscience should be paid to plaintiff in accordance with principles of
natural justice? If he has, the plaintiff may recover."' 24 The court
drew deep from the well of authority established by Angle, Federal
Sugar,and Samuel & Sons to conclude that recovery in quasi-contract
was no longer "limited to25cases in which something [had] been taken
from plaintiff's pocket."'
But there is one other element in Caskie which supports the
argument that the measure of recovery in quasi-contract for tortious
inducement of breach of contract should be expanded to include
profits. The court made a point of establishing the propriety of the
plaintiff's recovery in quasi-contract upon the principle that the tort
of inducing a breach of contract involved a violation of the plaintiff's
"rights."' 26 While the court did not explain what it considered
the nature of these intangible contractual "rights" to be, Judge
Rogers in Samuel & Sons had no misgivings as to their true substance. As he so bluntly stated:
Contract rights are property, and as such are entitled to the protection
of the law, and knowingly to induce one of the parties wrongfully to
repudiate a contract
is as distinct a wrong as it is to injure or destroy
27
his property.

Having thus established the tort of inducing a breach of contract
upon a violation of property rights, the court in Samuel & Sons progressed to its application of equitable principles to broaden the measure of recovery in quasi-contract. To understand fully the importance
of this legal redefinition of "property" rights and its effect upon the
measure of recovery in quasi-contract, it is necessary to explore the
function of such redefined "property" interests within the sphere
122 The court, however, indicated by way of a footnote that if plaintiff
had sought relief in equity, the court would have followed the example of
Judge Rogers in Samuel & Sons and certified the case to the law side. 321
Pa. at 160 n.3, 184 A. at 19 n.3.
123 The court later referred by way of footnote to Judge Mayer's language.
Id.-at 163 n.6, 184 A. at 20 n.6.
124 Id. at 161, 184 A. 17 at 19.
125
126

Id. at 163, 184 A. at 20.

"[T]he general principle [is] that a 'contract confers certain rights
on the person with whom it is made, and not only binds the parties to it by
the obligation entered into, but also imposes on all the world the duty of
respecting that contractual obligation.'" Id. at 159, 184 A. at 18, quoting from
Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q.B. 715, 730 (Lopes, L.J.).
127 12 F.2d at 967 (emphasis added).
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of equitable jurisdiction, as the mystique of "property" has long since
afforded recovery of tortiously appropriated property in a court of
equity via the remedy of a constructive trust. 128 What is important
is that while Judge Rogers and others 129 have been concerned with
including intangible contractual rights within the scope of property
rights protected by courts of law, there has been a similar and
significant movement in the equity courts towards relaxing the
jurisdictional requirement of a "property" interest to allow for an
expanded use of the equitable remedies of accounting and constructive trust. Either of these equitable remedies can be used for recovery
of profits. Thus, the adoption of a "property" interest as the foundation for an action in quasi-contract for tortious inducement of
breach of contract should also lead to a corresponding expansion
of the legal measure of recovery. To clarify this, some further analysis
of the movement in equity to de-emphasize "property" interests is
required. As one writer has commented:
[T]he abandonment of the property requirement as a condition of
equitable relief has been an erosive one, more often than not accomplished by a redefinition and enlargement of the definition of the idea
of "property" [to include intangible interests] .... The hurdle with
respect to the existence of a "property" interest [in intangibles] is
cleared by simply redefining property to include intangibles; or, if
this proves too great a wrench to hallowed concepts, to speak in terms
of "rights of substance," "pecuniary rights," or "quasi-property rights"
as worthy of equitable protection, avoiding 3for
the moment at least a
flat repudiation of time honored language. 0
Judge Brewer's use of the equitable remedy of the constructive
trust in Angle has already been noted,' 3 ' but since that case involved
tangible property interests as well as contractual "property" interests, the application of such a trust was not a clear and unequivocal
extension of an equitable remedy. The honor of so extending equitable protection when the only property interest involved was the
intangible one of contractual interests was reserved for the Court of
Errors and Appeals of New Jersey in the case of Schechter v.
Friedman.32 The case is unique in that the court allowed a plaintiff
to recover the profits of the tortfeasor directly in equity without a
pleading of any of the traditional requirements for equitable jurisdiction except the "property" interest of the breached contract.
In Schechter, the plaintiff had a contract with a sink manufacturer
giving the plaintiff the exclusive rights of distribution for the sinks.
With full knowledge of such contract the defendant induced the
manufacturer to accept from him an order for 1,000 sinks in violation
of its contract with the plaintiff. On the basis of this tort, the
plaintiff brought an action in equity -for an accounting of any
profits reaped by the defendant from the sale of such tortiously
128 See J.N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENc& & EQUITABLE REMEDIEs §
1053, at 119 (5th ed. 1941), and cases cited therein.
129. The cases are collected in Annot., 84 A.L.R. 52 (1933) and Annot., 26
A.L.R.2d 1240 (1952).
130 York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.
L. R v. 499, 509 (1957).
131 See text accompanying notes 101-02 supra.
132 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 57 A.2d 251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
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acquired sinks. While there was a hint of a fiduciary relationship, 33
and some reference to possibly fraudulent 134 statements made by the
defendant, the court ignored these elements as establishing the
plaintiff's right to an action in equity for an accounting, emphasizing
instead the integrity of the contractual relationship with which the
defendant had interfered. In upholding a decree for an accounting
for all of defendant's profits arising out of his interference, the court
reasoned as follows:
The case pleaded falls naturally into the classification of an actionable
infringement of a property right, i.e., the right to pursue one's business, calling, or occupation free from undue interference or molestashall be provided
tion .... Natural justice dictates that a remedy
for such unjust interposition in one's business. 135
This parallel expansion of legal and equitable remedies through a
redefinition of property interests may yet prove to be the best
argument that the measure of recovery in quasi-contract for tortious
unjust enrichment should be co-extensive with that of equity for
unjust enrichment, particularly where contractual interference is
involved. While it may be impossible to ignore the historical divergency between law and equity, this should not preclude a recognition
of the interdependence of these two streams of law when unjust
enrichment is the issue. Maintaining semantic barriers to exclude
a plaintiff from a court of law or a court of equity on the basis
of a factual situation is unjustified. Since the theory supporting
unjust enrichment is common to both law and equity, the remedy
should be the same regardless of the court to which the plaintiff
goes. Unfortunately, such a complete merger has not yet occurred.
The reasons why are perhaps best given by Professor Dawson:
When we take all these remedies [for unjust enrichment] together
the main source of our present difficulties becomes quite evident. It
is the multiplicity of our procedural resources for prevention of unjust
enrichment, a multiplicity which greatly exceeds that known in any
other legal system. But the multiplicity of remedies is complicated
further by diversity of origins. Each remedy has come to us from a
separate source, with its own load of traditions. Each functions somewhat differently and prevents unjust enrichment by different means.
Every one of them has been subjected in recent times to generalization of grounds, so that we have finally come to see the common
purpose that underlies them all. But something more than this realization is needed to cast off the accumulations of history. Tying them
while growth goes on, is one of our great unfinished
all together,
tasks.13 6

Action to Recover Profits of Tortfeasor for Unfair Competition
The judicial redefining of property has also had its influence upon
a rather unique and independent area of equity-the ever expanding
133 The plaintiff and the defendant had done business as partners previous
to this litigation, but at the time of the tortious acts of the defendant they
were in direct competition.
134 While the court alludes to the "maliciousness" of the defendant's conduct, at no point does the court refer to any statements of the defendant as
being fraudulent.
136 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 321, 57 A.2d 251, 254, (Ct. Err. & App. 1948), citing
Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934)
(emphasis added).

136 J.DAwsoN, UNTusT ENMCHMVENT 38-39 (1951).
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field of unfair competition. This is the second main channel through
which a plaintiff might move to recover profits of a tortfeasor who
has interfered with his contractual relations. A reclassification of the
particular tort of inducing a breach of contract under this broad
conglomerate of tortious business activities would make available to
the plaintiff the powerful remedy of accounting.
For various financial and moral considerations, 137 now obscured
by the haze of antiquity, courts have seen fit to allow a plaintiff
to appropriate any profits a tortfeasor might have gained as a result
of certain unfair business practices. Historically, however, the liberal
remedies of accounting and injunction available in unfair competition
litigations were restricted to situations involving two prerequisites:
13
(1) direct competition between the plaintiff and the defendant,
1 39
of
off"'
"palming
a
by
either
public
and (2) a confusion of the
the defendant's goods as those of the plaintiff or some other action
intended to create or likely to create uncertainty in the minds of
consumers. Most jurisdictions, 140 including California, 141 have negated the requirement for head-on competition, but there is a general
hesitancy, especially in this state, to disregard completely the criterion of public confusion as being determinative of whether or not there
has been unfair competition. The primary difficulty with attempting
to classify a tortious inducement of a breach of contract as "unfair
competition" is that the tortious inducement seldom involves any
"palming off" of goods or confusion of the public. It is clear, however,
that there has been a gradual judicial relaxation of the "palming
off" requirement so that it can no longer be said that the concept of
unfair competition is so confined. 142 Employment relationships have
again provided the initial stimulus for a broadening of remedies.
In the realm of personal service contracts, it was first held
that inducing a breach of an employee's contract with a rival employer,
137 For an extensive review of the underlying theories of unfair competition, see 1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETrrION TRADEMAMRS AND
MONOPOLIES 1-201 (3d ed. 1967).
138 Saperstein v. Grund, 85 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Iowa 1949); Cannister Co.
v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 20 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1937); Shepard v.
Shepard, 145 Neb. 12, 15 N.W.2d 195 (1944).
139 See, e.g., Consolidated Cosmetics v. Neilson Chem. Co., 109 F. Supp.
300 (E.D. Mich. 1952); Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1945); American Philatelic Soc'y v. Claibourne, 3 Cal. 2d 689, 46 P.2d 135
(1935).
140 Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947);
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 22 F. Supp. 180 (W.D.N.Y.
1938); American Shops v. American Fashion Shops, 13 N.J. Super. 416, 80
A.2d 575 (Super. Ct. 1951).
141 Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing, Ltd., 60 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Cal.
1945); Wood v. Peffer, 55 Cal. App. 2d 116, 130 P.2d 220 (1942).
142 "The earlier concept that a 'palming off' or fraudulent representation
of the goods of the seller as those of another was essential to injunctive relief
has undergone an extensive evolution. The law has demonstrated its capacity
to meet the ethical as well as the economic needs of modem society and the
exigencies of our more complex business concepts and relationships. The
extension of the doctrine has resulted in granting relief where there was no
fraud on the public but where one, for commercial advantage, has misappropriated the benefit or property right of another." Beecham v. London Gramophone Corp., 104 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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either by getting such employees to desert their jobs "under such circumstances rendering it difficult or embarrassing for him [the employer] to fill their places,"' 43 or by enticing the employees to reveal
trade secrets 4 4 or other special information 145 in violation of their
employment contracts, could be enjoined as unfair competition. It
can readily be seen that the unfair competition involved in these
cases could, at best, be only remotely connected to any "palming
off' of goods or confusion of the public. But at this point, the
previously described judicial redefining of "property" interests to
include intangibles assumes importance, for if the "palming off"
theory of unfair competition is disregarded, the criteria for bringing
an action for this tort must "shift to other theoretical foundations,
which bring to the surface the idea of misappropriation of intangible
values and with it the clear cut possibility of unjust enrichment."'14
While there are a great many cases tracing this evolution of
criteria, most of them have stemmed from the celebrated New York
case of InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,147 which held
that the unfair copying of news bulletins from a competitor's sources
was a misappropriation of property rights which would be remedied
by a court of equity. Speaking for the majority, Justice Pitney concluded:
It is said that the elements of unfair competition are lacking because
there is no attempt by defendant to palm off its goods as those of the
complainant, characteristic of the most familiar, if not the most typical, cases of unfair competition .... But we cannot concede that the
right to equitable relief is confined to that class of cases .... Regarding news matter as ... quasi property ... defendant's conduct
differs from the ordinary case of unfair competition in trade principally in this that, instead of selling its own goods as those of
complainant, it substitutes misappropriation in the place
of misrepre48
sentation, and sells complainant's goods as its own.1
While the plaintiff in InternationalNews was not asking for any
of defendant's profits, the court's language made it clear that if
a plaintiff under such circumstances sought an accounting it would
be granted. 149
This judicial protection of intangible property rights from misappropriation has been extended to cover property "rights" in opera
performances, 5 0 boxing matches,' 5 ' baseball games,'1 52 and even
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 259 (1917).
Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150
(2d Cir. 1949); California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App.
2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (1948).
145 See Beecham v. London Gramophone Corp., 104 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup.
Ct. 1951).
140 York, Extension of RestitutionalRemedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.
'43

144

L. REV. 499, 526 (1957).
347 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
148 Id. at 241-42.
149 See Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App.
Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1938) (profits asked for and allowed).
150 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
781, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), affd 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
'51 Twentieth Century Sporting Club v. Transradio Press Serv., 165 Misc.
71, 300 N.Y.S. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
152 Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30
N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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"trick" golf shots' 53 by classifying such misappropriations as unfair
competition, thus justifying the equitable intervention. That a contract right is an intangible property right has been firmly established
elsewhere,' 54 so that a classification of the particular tort of inducing
a breach of contract under the broader title of unfair competition
would seem to be both possible and desirable. The re-evaluation
throughout the entire spectrum of the law as to what constitutes
a property right protectable by equitable remedies makes such an
action possible, while the economic and mercantile overtones intimately associated with both the motive for the inducement of the
breach of contract and the subsequent profits of a successful inducement seems to make it an appropriate and desirable classification.

Summary
While recovery might preferably be sought in quasi-contract for
profits tortiously acquired by interference with contractual relations,
it cannot be predicted that a particular jurisdiction will consider the
Federal -Sugar Co. 155 case sufficient authority for disregarding the
more traditional "plus and minus" theories of recovery in quasicontract as postulated by Keener and Woodward. A plaintiff may be
faced with the choice as to whether he will pursue the profits of
the defendant directly in a court of equity, 15 or detour through the
realm of unfair competition. Since either of these latter two actions
is in equity, the plaintiff may have to overcome formidable barriers
hoisted by many courts to maintain the distinction between the legal
and the equitable.' 57 But a tort by any other name is still a tort,
and whether we impose on it the broad nomenclature of unfair competition or the self-descriptive narrowness of "inducing a breach of
contract," the adequacy and scope of the remedy should depend on
neither an arbitrary classification of the tort nor an overly stringent
distinction between the actions of law and equity. It is hoped, rather,
that a judicial synthesis of all restitutionary recoveries based on unjust enrichment, whether in law or equity, will alleviate the necessity
for such distinctions.
Recovery of Profits in California
The foregoing discussion has attempted to cover the general
status of the law as applicable to a cross section of jurisdictions
throughout the United States. Some brief mention should be made of
California law. Seeking the profits of a tortfeasor who has induced
a breach of plaintiff's contract in California either through an action
in quasi-contract or one for unfair competition, will be encumbered by
the fact that there is a significant dearth of authority in this state
for either approach. However, an action in quasi-contract for the
153 Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636

(1938).
154 Note 129

supra.

Note 103 supra.
156 Schechter v. Friedman, 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 57 A.2d 251 (Ct. Err. & App.
1948).
157 See notes 113 & 122 supra.
'55

May 1968J

INDUCEMENT OF BREACH OF CONTRACT

1141

profits of such a tortfeasor would have some support in this juris-

diction. In an early case' 1 California indicated an express policy
not to permit a wrongdoer to "derive any benefits" from his tortious
59
suggests a position
conduct, and language in other California cases'
on unjust enrichment in conformity with that of the Restatement of
Restitution and modern writers. The California courts have also
stressed the element of benefit as being of more significance than
loss or expense'6 0 so that while the courts in California have not
been faced with the particular facts or issues of the Federal Sugar

Co. case, the general policies and views of this state would seem to
be in harmony with those laid down in that decision.
As for detouring through unfair competition, while language can
be found in early California cases' 61 indicating a desire to follow a
flexible and independent policy in classifying acts as unfair competition, the following recent holdings in California have definitely restricted the actions for such a tort to situations where there is, or is
likelihood of, confusion of the public as to the nature, quality or
ownership of an article sold on the market.
In the 1965 federal case of Filon Plastics Corp. v. H. Koch &
Sons, 0

2

the United States District Court summed up its interpretation

of present California law in these words: 16 3 "Under the law of
California the test of unfair competition is whether there is likely
to be deception of the public, whether there has been a palming off
of defendant's goods as those of plaintiff." The California Supreme
Court echoed this interpretation in Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp.164
of
with the statement that "the wrong in unfair competition consists
65
the sale of goods of one manufacturer as those of another."'

There

is substantial recent authority for both of these statements. 166
Although the California lawmakers have provided legislation on
this subject,16 7 it is of an unusually vague nature so that California
courts have construed this legislation as simply providing nonrestrictive guidelines, and that in the last analysis what constitutes un15s Alvarez v. Brannan, 7 Cal. 503, 509 (1857).
159 "The action for money had and received will lie wherever it appears
that defendant has received money which in equity and good conscience he
should pay to plaintiff." Fox v. Monahan, 8 Cal. App. 707, 709, 97 P. 765
(1908); accord, Traders Ins. Co. v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co., 150 Cal.
370, 89 P. 109 (1907); Sacramento County v. Southern Pac. Co., 127 Cal. 217,
221, 59 P. 568, 569 (1899); Quimby v. Lyon, 63 Cal. 394, 395 (1883); Briggs v.
Marcus-Lesoine, Inc., 3 Cal. App. 2d 207, 39 P.2d 442 (1934); Black v. Riley,
20 Cal. App. 199, 128 P. 764 (1912).
160 Conlin v. Studebaker Bros. Co., 175 Cal. 395, 165 P. 1009 (1917);
French v. Robbins, 172 Cal. 670, 158 P. 188 (1916); Fuller v. Reed, 38 Cal. 99,
110 (1869); Miller v. Murphy, 78 Cal. App. 751, 248 P. 934 (1926).
161 Ojala v. Bohlin, 178 Cal. App. 2d 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1960); Grant
v. California Bench Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 706, 173 P.2d 817 (1946); Katz v.
Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935).
162 243 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
163 Id. at 649.
164 63 Cal. 2d 199, 404 P.2d 486, 45 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1965).
165 Id. at 214, 404 P.2d at 495, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
166 See, e.g., Haeger Potteries v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.
Cal. 1954); West v. Lind, 186 Cal. App. 2d 563, 9 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1960).
167 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369.
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fair competition in a particular case is a question of fact to be
determined by the courts.1 8 While this liberal construction of
legislation would seem to foreshadow a broadening of the concept
of unfair competition, it has actually produced just the opposite
result. With such ambiguous authority as the only support for restraining acts of unfair competition, the courts in this jurisdiction
most cautious in their use of injunctions'6 9 and accounthave17been
0
ings. '
Again, while language can be found basing the action of unfair
competition on a protection of property rights' 7 ' (which should include
contractual "rights"), the courts in California have managed to uphold
the sanctity of contract rights as property rights and still divert any
argument from leading to a broadening of the concept of unfair
competition. To accomplish this the courts have stated on a number
of occasions' 7 2 that rules of unfair competition are based not only
upon the protection of property rights existing in a plaintiff, but are
predominantly based on the rights of the public to protection from
fraud and deceit. Thus, while the protection of property rights does
provide some foundation for an action for unfair competition in some
jurisdictions, it is neither the sole nor dominant criterion in California.
Therefore, if contractual interference is involved a plaintiff in this
jursdiction would have a better chance at securing the defendant's
profits via the action of quasi-contract.
Dennis M. Sullivan*
168

Hall v. Wright, 125 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Grant v. California

Bench Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 706, 173 P.2d 817 (1946).
169 Cleaning & Dye House Workers v. Landowitz, 20 Cal. 2d 418, 126 P.2d
609 (1942).
170 ,Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal. App. 2d 535, 145 P.2d 305 (1944); Katz v.
Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935).
171 Ojala v. Bohlin, 178 Cal. App. 2d 292, 2 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1960).
172

See, e.g., People v. Nat'l Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal.

Rptr. 516 (1962).
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